Skip to Content

Press Releases

Wittman, Norcross Urge Army to Counter CCP Aggression Through Guam’s Missile Defense

Today, Congressman Rob Wittman (VA-01), vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and chairman of the Tactical Air Land Forces (TAL) Subcommittee, and Congressman Donald Norcross (NJ-01), ranking member of the subcommittee, sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth, urging the Army to support Guam's cruise missile defense against the Chinese Communist Party’s increasing military aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.

Given the HASC’s legislative responsibility for U.S. missile defense programs, the lawmakers’ letter will ensure that long-term funding and policy decisions made in the annual National Defense Authorization Act are right-sized to secure the defense of Guam for years to come. 

“While the United States has developed sea and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities and a credible sea-based cruise missile defense capability, we believe that significant gaps exist in our land-based missile defense capabilities used to counter drones, artillery rockets and cruise missiles,” the lawmakers write. “As discussed in the DoD Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023 Annual Report to Congress, we are particularly concerned about expeditiously closing this gap with the developing Guam missile defense capability as a credible deterrence against an increasingly capable PRC Rocket Forces.”

“Congress directed the Army to establish an interim cruise missile defense capability and Army subsequently awarded a contract for two Iron Dome batteries,” the lawmakers continue. “While this was a good first step, we believe it is imperative to accelerate the overall development of a land-based cruise missile defense capability, particularly as it relates to the joint architecture being developed for the Defense of Guam.

To read the full letter to Secretary Wormuth, click here or scroll below.

____

November 13, 2023

The Honorable Christine Wormuth 

Secretary 

U.S. Department of the Army 

101 Army Pentagon 

Washington, D.C. 20310-0101


Dear Secretary Wormuth, 


While the United States has developed sea and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities and a credible sea-based cruise missile defense capability, we believe that significant gaps exist in our land-based, missile defense capabilities used to counter drones, artillery rockets and cruise missiles. As discussed in the DoD Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023 Annual Report to Congress, we are particularly concerned about expeditiously closing this gap with the developing Guam missile defense capability as a credible deterrence against an increasingly capable PRC Rocket Forces. Congress directed the Army to establish an interim cruise missile defense capability and the Army subsequently awarded a contract for two Iron Dome batteries. While this was a good first step, we believe it is imperative to accelerate the overall development of a land-based cruise missile defense capability, particularly as it relates to the joint architecture being developed for the Defense of Guam.


The Army began development of an Enduring Cruise Missile Defense System entitled Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2 as a Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) program in fiscal year 2021. The Army previously indicated its intent to integrate an IFPC capability of a launcher and interceptor leveraging the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) open systems architecture, the IAMD Battle Command System (IBCS) as the Fire Control component, and the Sentinel sensor, with initial system procurements starting in fiscal year 2024 for a full operational capability in 2030. However, it is our understanding that the operational assessment of the launcher prototype would be delayed to early FY25, putting into question fielding in FY26. Furthermore, Army indicated their intent to competitively develop a second interceptor that would provide capability against supersonic cruise missiles, large caliber rockets, and have increased range over the AIM-9X.


The AIAMD is particularly urgent for the joint defense of Guam architecture. Expeditiously closing the cruise missile defense gap in terms of capability and capacity to defend against PRC cruise missiles attacking land-based targets at Guam is particularly urgent. As we consider options for addressing our cruise missile defense gaps, we are seeking to address how the Army can accelerate efforts to deploy IFPC Inc 2, particularly with respect to the Defense of Guam architecture:

  1. We understand that the operational assessment of the launcher prototype would be delayed to early FY25. Considering this delay, is IFPC Inc 2 still scheduled to be fielded by FY26? If not, when does the Army expect that it will be fielded?

  2. Is the Army still scheduled to receive all 16 launcher prototypes and 60 fieldable interceptor prototypes by March 2024? If not, what is the expected date of receipt? 

  3. What is the integration timeline of IFPC Inc 2 with IBCS and Sentinel sensor?

  4. What are the requirements associated with the IFPC Inc 2 second interceptor program including cost targets? 

  5. What is the Army’s plan to provide adequate cruise missile defenses for Guam before IFPC Inc 2 becomes fully operational? 

  6. How are the AIM-9X and TAMIR missiles assessed to address adversary cruise missile threats and particularly those threats expected in the defense of Guam?

  7. How are our partners and allies integrated into the Guam air defense architecture? 


We appreciate your support in improving Army’s contributions to Guam’s cruise missile defense architecture as we continue to develop a credible, deterrent capable missile defense architecture and seek to address an increasingly aggressive PRC posture in the INDOPACOM area.


###